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G R A N D S T R AT E G I E S F O R D E A L I N G W I T H O T H E R
STATES IN THE NEW, NEW WORLD ORDER
James F. Miskel

T

he art of statecraft has often involved efforts to improve the security of one
state by taking advantage of the power and influence of other states. This is,
for example, why a state typically seeks to forge military alliances with others. It
is also why some states provide economic and military support to client or dependent states and why some advocate the formation of multistate trading
blocs. The theory behind the trading-bloc strategy is that cooperation on security matters is more likely when there are strong economic and other mutually
beneficial connections among the members of the bloc. Among the tools that
have been and are being used to influence other states are trade preferences,
loans, loan guarantees, concessionary pricing for military sales, export-import
financing, technical assistance, foreign aid, and international disaster relief.
While humanitarian altruism is a major factor in forDr. Miskel is the associate dean of academics at the
eign aid and disaster relief, statesmen often see the reNaval War College and a former professor in the Colduction of suffering as a method of improving the
lege’s National Security Decision Making Department.
Earning his doctorate at the State University of New
stability of a recipient state or as an inducement for a
York at Binghamton in 1977, he served in the Departrecipient state to cooperate more fully on security
ment of Health and Human Services before joining the
matters.
Federal Emergency Management Agency in 1984. He
was the director for defense policy on the National SecuMany ideas for making American foreign policy
rity Council staff in 1987–89, thereafter returning to
more effective have been offered in recent years. Some
FEMA as assistant associate director. He is the author of
of them involve ways of prioritizing all forms of offiBuying Trouble? National Security and Reliance on
Foreign Industry (1993) and of articles in numerous
cial, state-to-state assistance on those states whose stajournals.
bility or cooperation will most benefit the national
interests of the United States. Obviously, there are
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many states that are already stable and already do generally cooperate with the
United States. Canada, Japan, and the states of Western Europe (disagreements
over the second war with Iraq notwithstanding) fall into this category. Certainly
the economically advanced and politically stable states of the collective “West”
have a common interest in suppressing the signal threat—global terrorism—of
the new, new world order that sprang from the rubble of the World Trade Center
and Pentagon on 11 September 2001. Thus the real focus of foreign policy reform proposals is on the large number of states that are neither as economically
advanced nor as stable as Japan, Canada, and Western Europe.
Three general approaches have been proposed for identifying the states outside the “winner’s circle” of economically advanced and stable states whose cooperation and stability contribute most to the national interests of the United
States. Each of these approaches—as should be expected, because of the emphasis of all on state-to-state relations—is realist in its assumption that the state is
the most important actor in world affairs and thus that working through and
with other states is an effective way for the United States to further its national
interests. The general approaches would respectively devote the lion’s share of
state-to-state assistance to one of the following groups of states:

• Lever, or pivotal, states through which the United States can promote
stability in a region and thus tamp down the threat of terrorism

• Buffer states that can be strengthened to become more effective insulators
against terrorist attacks upon the United States and its interests

• Failed or failing states, the restoration of which to functionality would
eliminate platforms from which terrorists might plan, prepare, or launch
attacks upon the United States or its overseas interests.
Each of these options is based on distinctly different assumptions about the
role that other states can play on the world stage and about the type of contributions that they can make in the global war on terror. This article examines these
assumptions and finds that they are in some important respects inconsistent
with security threats that will face the United States in the early twenty-first
century.
PIVOTAL STATES
In the late 1990s, after the Cold War but before the global war on terrorism—
that is to say, during the original new world order and before the new, new world
order—the notion of pivotal states enjoyed considerable support, because it recognized something that should have been, even if it was not, intuitively obvious.
That something was that it made sense for the United States to organize its

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss1/4

2

Miskel: Grand Strategies for Dealing with Other Statesin the New, New Wor
MISKEL

65

foreign policy priorities so as to ensure that states that deserved a lot of attention
got a lot of attention, and conversely that states that deserved less attention got
less. The approach, proposed by Professor Paul Kennedy and other authors, may
appear somewhat dated now, but it is based upon an enduring principle—that
state-to-state assistance would be most effective if it were targeted at states that
would then exert favorable (to American interests) influence regionwide. The
general rule for determining whether a state deserved a good deal of attention
boiled down to the following: if a state’s successes and failures had major ripple
1
effects on neighboring states, that state was ipso facto a pivotal state.
The pivotal-states strategy calls to mind the saying, “When Brazil [or any
dominant state] sneezes, Argentina [or any smaller neighboring state] catches
cold.” Brazil was, indeed, designated by Paul Kennedy and his
It is less than clear that the conditions in
coauthors as a pivotal state by virfailed states actually offer better opportunities
tue of the size of its population
for terrorists than do conditions in certain
and economy relative to neighfunctional states.
boring states, and Argentina’s
economy did indeed actually
“catch cold” when Brazil devalued its currency in 1999. Obviously the pivotal-states strategy aims at the positive effects that a pivotal state can have on its
neighbors.
According to the strategy, the United States should target its foreign aid, economic preferences, concessionary military sales, and technical assistance on the
“Brazils” of the world and at the same time reduce its aid and assistance to other
states, including their nonpivotal neighbors—for example, Argentina. Extending the health analogy, the strategy called for the United States to give vitamins to Brazil in order to promote rosy cheeks in both Brazil and Argentina. To
do otherwise, Kennedy and his coauthors argued, would spread state-to-state assistance so thinly among a large number of recipient states that no single one
would get enough aid to make a real difference.
The image projected by the pivotal-states strategy is proactive. The strategy
seeks to influence regionally dominant states precisely because those states are
regionally dominant. They are pivots because they extend muscular tentacles of
economic, cultural, political, and ideological influence into their respective hinterlands. Perhaps because of this focus on relatively powerful states, this strategy
implies a high level of respect for the sovereignty and national interests of the recipient states.
Like all of the strategies discussed here, the pivotal-states strategy is easier to
describe than to execute. It assumes that decisions about import quotas, tariffs,
and foreign aid will actually be made (or perhaps only wishes they would be
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made) on the basis of foreign policy considerations alone. The reality is, of
course, often quite different. Such decisions are political judgments and will always be heavily colored by estimates about their likely effects on domestic constituencies. Higher quotas and lower tariffs are inevitably evaluated and voted
up or down on the basis of their impact on the U.S. economy and, more particularly, on domestic American industries—often with only scant regard for their
potential effects on a pivotal state in a distant region of the world. President
George W. Bush’s March 2002 decision on steel import tariffs is a good case in
point. Although it has since been rescinded, the tariffs were very clearly designed
to support the domestic steel industry regardless of its effects on foreign trading
partners. Similarly, decisions about where to invest foreign aid or even sell military hardware at concessionary prices are always influenced by political pressures from constituency groups, be they individuals who want to extend the
helping hand of foreign aid to whoever needs it regardless of the overall foreign
policy, or industry representatives and labor lobbyists who want to maximize
sales whether the opportunities are in high or low-priority markets.
Moreover, circumstances change, often in ways that disrupt the best-laid
plans of strategists. For example, Afghanistan was never considered a pivotal or
even moderately important state until after the Taliban refused to turn over the
11 September terrorists. Nevertheless, the country is getting a considerable share
of American nation-building and peacekeeping resources. This seems to indicate that it would be impossible for the United States to adhere to any spending
priority list over time.
On the other hand, a truly rigorous concentration of foreign aid, trade preferences, and intensive technical assistance, etc., on a very small number of pivotal
states can have profoundly positive effects on a region. This was the case in postwar
Germany and Japan, and it appears to be the strategy the United States is following
with respect to Iraq. The objectives of the very heavy investment in postwar reconstruction in Iraq clearly include the stabilization of the Middle East region as
a whole and the promotion of political and economic reform in neighboring
states—including, of course, states with unrepresentative regimes that have
been sponsoring terrorism or at least not acting effectively to suppress it.
Focusing on only one or two pivotal states (for example, Iraq and Afghanistan) amounts to a pivotal-regions strategy (or in this instance, region), a substantially different approach in that it does not identify pivotal states in every
major region or focus aid on them as levers for the promotion of American national interests around the world. For the time being, considering the Greater
Middle East as the pivotal region may make good strategic sense. The Middle
East is, in fact, a crucially important region at this point, because it is the ideological and financial wellspring of Islamic extremism, and because its oil
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resources play such an important role in the world economy. Nonetheless, the
reconstruction project in Iraq will one day be completed, internationalized, or
abandoned, and when that day comes questions about whether state-to-state aid
should be concentrated on pivotal, buffer, or failed states will reemerge.
BUFFER STATES
Buffer-states strategies also envision that the United States would provide
greater amounts of economic, political, and military support to some states than
to others, but in this strategy the priority traditionally has been states that can
solidify the local status quo, rather than states with resources that can be leveraged into greater influence over events in distant regions.
For example, the Soviet Union established the Warsaw Pact in order to provide a “cordon sanitaire” between the motherland and the West. Stalin’s cocooning strategy clearly viewed the Eastern European satellites as insulators between
the core of the Soviet empire and the sources of economic, cultural, and ideological contagion in the West. He saw the satellites also as shock absorbers that
could contribute to the preservation of his hard-won empire by serving as first
lines of defense in the event of a military attack by NATO. Ironically, before
World War II some Western European leaders had viewed the very same Eastern
European states as buffers against Bolshevism. Until the dawn of the nuclear age
and now the global war on terrorism, the oceans were thought to constitute all
the buffers that the United States needed, although there have occasionally been
arguments for prioritizing aid to Mexico so that it could better protect the
United States against infiltration and mass migration from Central America.
The image projected by buffer-states strategies is reactive. Buffer-states strategies aim at local, not widely dispersed, states. Their contributions are defensive,
and their ability to project economic, cultural, political, and ideological influence over other states is immaterial.
Lately there has been interest in a strategy that appears to combine aspects of
both the buffer and pivotal-states strategies. This “seam states” strategy was formulated and effectively articulated by a Naval War College colleague, Dr.
2
Thomas P. M. Barnett. As envisioned by Barnett, the seam-states approach
forms part of a larger strategy involving improvements in homeland security
and proactive interventions in nonseam states. Barnett’s seams resemble the
fault lines between civilizations or cultures that were envisioned by Professor
3
Samuel Huntington in the early 1990s; however, Barnett’s lines in the sand are
fewer in number, more fluid, and more heavily based on secular phenomena than
were Huntington’s cultural fault lines.
The seams represent the dividing line between two figurative tectonic plates.
One plate contains the states that are connected with, or are attempting with at
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least some success to connect with, the “West” through globalization. This plate
accounts for approximately two-thirds of the world’s population, and it represents, in Barnett’s schema, an economic and political winners’ circle of relatively
stable and prosperous states. The other plate represents the remaining one-third
of the world’s population who reside in states that are disconnected, or are deliberately disconnecting themselves, from the evolving norms, practices, and institutions of globalization. Barnett argues that in the new, new world order this is
where the main security threats originate. The threats may be from a state
(North Korea), a terrorist group sponsored by a state (Hizbollah), or terrorists
acting completely independently of a state (al-Qa‘ida), but in each instance the
threat is assumed to emanate from an entity based on the second tectonic plate.
According to this strategy, states along the seams between the tectonic plates
are potentially important because they can serve collectively as a barrier inhibiting the ability of terrorist networks on the second plate to attack states on the
first plate—but not every state on the seam is equally important.
Twelve of the most important seam states are designated by Barnett for priority attention. The twelve would get more economic, political, and military assistance from the United States; other advanced countries and other seam states
would get less. Of the twelve most important seam states, Professor Kennedy and
others earlier identified seven as pivotal states.

• States (seven) on both the pivotal and seam-states lists: Algeria, Brazil,
Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey

• States (five) on seam-states list only: Greece, Malaysia, Morocco, the
Philippines, Thailand

• States (two) on the pivotal states list only: Egypt, India.
Although the focus of this essay is on the overall strategies, rather than
nuts-and-bolts decisions about which states warrant higher priority, the list of
key seam states does invite comment. Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines
share maritime borders primarily with each other and land borders with only
four states: the first-plate states of Singapore and Brunei, the second-plate—but
nonthreatening—state of Papua New Guinea, and Thailand, which is designated
as another key seam state. In effect, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines do
not actually abut any significant segment of the seam between the first tectonic
plate and the second. This suggests that these three states are designated for priority attention for some reason other than their status as seam states, which in
turn may raise questions about the assumptions upon which the strategy was
built. It seems clear that the region as a whole is what is strategically important—the vast expanse of ocean, a huge number of islands, and heavily
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trafficked sea-lanes that Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines individually
govern—not the ability of the three states to serve as buffers between the first
and second tectonic plates.
Despite the high degree of overlap between the seam-states and pivotal-states
lists, the seam-states strategy is, in fact, more closely aligned philosophically
with the buffer-states approach. The seam and buffer-states strategies concentrate state-to-state assistance on a selected number of states that have primarily
defensive functions and may or may not be able to project economic, cultural,
political, or ideological influence at the regional level. In this strategy, influence
is projected beyond the seam by the state that provides the assistance in the first
place—the United States.
In concluding that the key seam states could function as effective barriers
against terrorist networks, the strategy makes two important assumptions. One
is that the seam states actually provide some sort of physical barrier between the
first and second plates; the second is that terrorist networks would actually have
to transit the barrier in order to
attack the United States or one of
The pivotal-states strategy calls to mind the
its neighbors on the first tectonic
saying, “When Brazil sneezes, Argentina
plate. Both of these assumptions
catches cold.”
are questionable, given the nature
of modern transportation networks and the relatively small volume of men and materiel that terrorist organizations would actually have to move from one location to another in order to
attack a state in the winners’ circle. As long as commercial airlines fly to places
like Kabul and Khartoum and ships dock at ports in South Asia and West Africa,
terrorist organizations will be able to fly over or sail around whatever barriers
the seam states provide.
The strategy also assumes that the key seam states are now or soon will be (after having received state-to-state assistance) physically capable of controlling
their borders and exerting on-the-ground control over remote internal regions.
This indeed would seem to be the sine qua non of the strategy, for if a state cannot control its own territory, it can hardly serve as an effective barrier against intrusion or movement between the second and first plates.
At least four (Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brazil) of the twelve
key seam states long ago demonstrated the inability to assert control over remote
internal areas or effectively police their land and sea borders. Terrorists having
already established bases of operation in three of them—Pakistan, the Philippines, and Indonesia—it is clear that none has presented a major barrier to terrorist networks in the past. Enough incidents of terrorism continue to occur in
each of these countries (a March 2003 bombing in the Philippines’ second
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biggest airport, the August 2003 hotel bombing in Jakarta and the October 2002
bombing of a Bali resort in Indonesia, and the intermittent terrorism in Kashmir
conducted or supported by Pakistani groups) to raise doubts that any of the
three will become effective barriers any time soon. Although there are as yet no
signs that the fourth, Brazil, is home to anti-American terrorist base camps,
there are serious questions about the extent of Brazil’s effective control over its
remote interior sections, in particular near the western borders with Colombia
and Peru and the southern frontier with Paraguay and Argentina.
The seam-states strategy envisions a robust program of state-to-state assistance (military sales, military advisers and trainers, foreign aid, technical assistance on law enforcement and government reforms, and favorable trade
agreements) to help key seam states improve and extend their governing capacities so as to prevent second-plate terrorists from attacking first-plate targets.
A program of this magnitude is daunting, to say the least, and unlikely to be
resourced adequately. Moreover, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Brazil,
and perhaps other key seam states ultimately lack sufficient incentives to exert
themselves seriously in underpopulated rural zones; all face more direct challenges in their overcrowded cities. Demographic trends suggest that the urban
challenges will get worse, not better. Pakistan, Indonesia, Brazil, the Philippines,
and also Malaysia have vast land or maritime borders that are virtually impossible to control without unaffordable increases in their security budgets. For example, the coastlines of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines total about
sixty thousand miles—five times the length of the coastline of the United States.
It is hard to envision Indonesia, Malaysia, or the Philippines ever being able to
control effectively more than a tiny percentage—that is, ever being truly effective at the role that the seam strategy envisions for them.
FAILING STATES
Failing-states strategies are of a completely different order than pivotal, buffer,
or seam-states strategies. Theoretically, pivotal and buffer-states strategies target
other states as being relatively capable of either projecting influence regionally
or acting as barriers against intrusion by third parties. Failing states are capable
of neither, and it is their very incapacity that causes some strategists to believe
that they warrant high priority in state-to-state assistance.
Failed states have been variously defined. Some definitions include states that
have simply ceased to exist and have been succeeded by others. For example, under some definitions the Austro-Hungarian Empire would be a failed state, because the geography and population centers once administered as one entity by
the Hapsburgs are now administered by successor states. By this yardstick, the
term “failing state” could have applied to the Soviet Union during the late

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss1/4

8

Miskel: Grand Strategies for Dealing with Other Statesin the New, New Wor
MISKEL

71

Gorbachev and early Yeltsin eras. For the purposes of strategies for dealing with
current and future security issues, such inclusive definitions are useless; a state’s
failure is often positive in terms of U.S. national interests, as for example when a
state that sponsors terrorism fails or, as in Iraq, is made to fail. A state’s failure
can also leave behind successor states that are politically stable, administratively
competent, or connected with the norms of the economically advanced states on
the first tectonic plate. Some of the Soviet Union’s successor states (Russia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia) fall into this category, as do a number of Hapsburg successor states (Austria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary).
A more pertinent definition focuses on sovereign states that exist on paper as
members of the United Nations and thus are candidates for state-to-state assistance but that have ceased to provide basic government services to their citizenry, often because of internal strife—as in Somalia in the early 1990s and
Liberia in 2003. Initially of concern because of the humanitarian consequences
of civil wars, forced starvation, and human rights abuses, failed states have come
to be seen by some as launching pads for terrorists and major criminal organizations as well as wellsprings of destabilizing refugee movements and breeding
4
grounds for virulent diseases.
Quite a few scholars and government officials have burned a good deal of
tread off their tires trying to devise taxonomies for failing states. This veritable
cottage industry attempts to identify warning signs that might enable the international community to intervene early enough to prevent other states from failing. The theory behind these efforts is that concentrated state-to-state assistance
for states in danger of failing will prevent failure and thereby:

• Eliminate opportunities for terrorist and criminal organizations to
establish bases of operations

• Remove the incentive for refugees to flee into other countries
• Enable law enforcement, humanitarian, and public health agencies to
expand their operations and thereby gradually improve living conditions
and prevent the spread of crime and disease.
It is clear that the internal chaos and anarchy of failing states do indeed create
fertile breeding grounds for crime, human rights abuses, disease, and starvation.
But notwithstanding the assumptions of this strategy, it is much less clear that
the conditions in failed states actually offer better opportunities for terrorists
than do conditions in certain functional states.
For example, states that actively sponsor terrorism with money, police protection, or weapons and that share intelligence reports about impending antiterrorist operations tend not to be failing. Such “services” may simply not be
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reliably available in a failing state. States that are genuinely failing are not typically well connected with Western intelligence sources and are thus usually not
in a position to obtain or leak advance warning to terrorists. Further, they often
exert little control over the internal security forces that might be expected to
provide protection to terrorist base camps. Moreover, failing states may be
viewed by terrorists as being unable to provide more than token resistance to
antiterrorist incursions by neighboring states or special operations units from
Western states. Failing states may even be seen by terrorist organizations as incapable of distinguishing between antiterrorist incursions and indigenous violence—and thus as unable or unwilling to offer even stout legal defenses of their
sovereignty.
This is not to say that terrorists do not operate or establish base camps in failing states. They do. However, the issue for strategists seeking to prioritize the investments in state-to-state assistance is not whether there are terrorist
organizations in failing states. For strategists the issue is whether the terrorist organizations and operations in failing states are more dangerous to the United
States than terrorist organizations and operations in functioning states.
Fund-raising by terrorist organizations is one aspect of this isStates along the seams between the tectonic
sue. It has b een noted that
plates are potentially important because they
terrorist organizations finance
can serve collectively as a barrier—but not
their operations through criminal
every state on the seam is equally important.
activity in failing states. For example, there have been reports that al-Qa‘ida has been trafficking in diamonds
5
smuggled from the failing states of Liberia and Sierra Leone. The profits that
al-Qa‘ida earns from reselling diamonds apparently help finance the group’s operations and enable it to maintain its communications network and purchase
weapons. Obviously, anything that enables groups like al-Qa‘ida to finance their
operations ought to be of substantial concern to strategists, but it should be remembered that the problem is hardly unique to failing states. While smuggling
is considerably easier in a failed state that cannot control its borders, goods are
also smuggled out of functioning states (e.g., diamonds from Tanzania, drugs
from Colombia, small arms from Russia), and the profits from these enterprises
can also finance terrorist groups. In fact, criminal enterprises inside functioning
states can also generate funds for terrorists. Even in the United States, terrorist
operatives or their sympathizers have engaged in illegal activity (such as smuggling cigarettes from low-tax states like North Carolina for resale in high-tax
states like New York, embezzling from charities, extorting money from legitimate businessmen and families) in order to raise funds for terrorism.
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Another factor to consider is that the most serious recent terrorist attacks on
first-plate states have been based either in the first-plate state itself or in a state
that was not considered to have failed. The bombings in Indonesia were reportedly undertaken by an Indonesian terrorist group, and the 11 September attacks
on the United States sprang from a complex of headquarters, training camps,
and weapons caches in Afghanistan. On 10 September 2001 most observers felt
that Afghanistan under the Taliban suffered from too much government, not
too little. The Taliban might have failed to improve the living conditions in Afghanistan, but it did control enough of the country to make al-Qa‘ida view the
Taliban government as a sound strategic partner—one that would be able to
assert state sovereignty and provide protection to al-Qa‘ida operations. None
of the individuals indicted for the March 2004 terrorist bombing in Spain was
from a failing state—in fact, most were from one of the designated seam states,
Morocco.
Events in Afghanistan and Indonesia strongly suggest that in terms of the war
on terrorism, the threat posed by groups in failing states is no more serious than
the threat posed by groups operating in lightly governed (or ungovernable)
zones inside functioning states. As noted above in connection with the
seam-states strategy, the phenomenon of remote and only nominally administered rural or coastal zones inside functioning states is already a serious problem
in some parts of the world. As urbanization continues to deplete rural populations and force national governments to concentrate on governing cities, the
phenomenon may become more widespread.
THE LURE OF ELEGANT CATEGORIZATIONS
This article has sought to compare and contrast the assumptions and conceptual
approaches embedded in three broad strategies for maximizing the benefits the
United States receives from state-to-state assistance programs. None of the three
represents an adequate strategy for dealing with the security threats of the present day and age.
Each of the three depends heavily upon the ability of strategists to perform
two functions well: first, to decide which states are more important than others
in terms of their contributions to the “bottom line”; and second, to adhere to the
designated priorities over extended periods of time, not just a single fiscal year.
The difficulty of actually performing both tasks well should not be underestimated. Judgments about where the United States should invest its time and
money are inherently and inescapably political, and in practice they are likely to
reflect domestic considerations as much as strategic calculations. Political pressures from domestic interest groups and unanticipated developments overseas
will not only shape the original priority list of recipient states but cause our
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investment patterns to diverge from whichever strategy is officially adopted. In
the unlikely event that an elegant game plan were actually adopted, it would not
be long before we began to violate it.
Moreover, each of the general strategies reflects assumptions about the role of
other states that may be inappropriate for the security threats posed in the new,
new world order. Indeed, it may well be that the very idea of categorizing states
according to the role that the United States would assign them (extending a stabilizing influence over a region, serving as a barrier against external threats, reestablishing stability over the territory of a failing state) is misguided, because
of the quicksilver nature of the terrorist threats emanating from “beyond the
seam.” As we have seen, at least some terrorist groups seem able to disperse and
reorganize (perhaps under different names), relocate at great distance
(al-Qa‘ida’s relocation from Sudan to Afghanistan is the best example), and
quickly form partnerships of convenience with groups in other countries, including first-plate states like Great Britain and France. The pivotal states, buffer/
seam-states and failed-states strategies plod in comparison. By the time
state-to-state assistance has had its hoped-for effects on a pivotal, key seam or failing state, the terrorist organizations will have moved on to other locations from
which they could base operations, devise new routes for attack on the “West,” or
forge new alliances with dissident groups inside first-plate or seam states.
The pivotal, buffer, and seam-states strategies each more or less assumes that
all states that are categorized as high priority will play roughly the same role. For
example, a seam-states strategy assumes that once having received state-to-state
assistance, all of the key seam states will at least attempt to serve as effective barriers to third-party threats. If this assumption were not made, there would be no
logical reason to pursue the strategy in the first place. It is also assumed that a
state could be a pivot or a nonpivot, but not both—a seam state or a nonseam
state, but not both.
The problem is that at least some of the states that would be designated as pivotal and key seam states have characteristics of failing or beyond-the-seam
states. That is to say, several of the pivot or key seam states contain zones where
they have simply failed to exert effective control. These ungoverned or very
lightly governed zones (such as the fastness of Pakistan’s mountainous border
with Afghanistan, where Osama Bin Laden has reportedly been managing
to avoid capture and orchestrate terrorist actions in first-plate states),
out-of-the-way islands in Indonesia, dense patches of jungle in the Philippine
archipelago, and the isolated interior of Brazil are already home to terrorist organizations and could provide bases of terrorist operations in the future. Many
of these pivot or seam states have pressing social problems in overpopulated cities and are not highly motivated even to attempt to play the role scripted for

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss1/4

12

Miskel: Grand Strategies for Dealing with Other Statesin the New, New Wor
MISKEL

75

them in the pivot and seam-states strategies—to assert control over remote and
dangerous regions. In some of these states, governance is a delicate balancing act
among ethnic minorities or religious factions. Their rulers may well see their
own interests as being best served by lip service to the role of pivot or buffer.
Given these considerations, the lure of grand strategies based on elegant categorizations of states should be resisted. A more effective approach would be to
do more of something we do not do enough of today—allocate security-related
assistance to other states on the basis of that state’s potential contribution to
specific high-priority projects or functions in the war on terrorism. Examples
are the collection and sharing of intelligence information about terrorist organizations, law enforcement action against indigenous terrorist groups with affiliations to al-Qa‘ida, suppression of illegal fund-raising activities by terrorist
organizations, and effective regulation and monitoring of financial transfers
that support terrorist organizations.
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